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Abstract 
This paper investigated readers’ representations of the main protagonist’s emotional status in 
short narratives, as well as several mental factors that may affect these representations. 
General and visuo-spatial working memory, empathy and simulation were investigated as 
potential individual differences in generating emotional inferences. Participants were 
confronted with narratives conveying information about the protagonist’s emotional state. We 
manipulated each narrative’s target sentence according to its content (emotional label vs. 
description of the behavior associated to the emotion) and to its congruence to the story 
(matching vs. mismatching). The results showed that globally the difference between reading 
times of congruent and incongruent target sentences was bigger in the behavioral than in the 
emotional condition. This pattern was accentuated for high visuo-spatial working memory 
participants when they were asked to simulate the stories. These results support the idea that 
mental models may be of a perceptual nature and may more likely include behavioral 
elements than emotion labels per se, as suggested earlier by Gygax et al. (2007). 
Keywords: text comprehension, emotional inferences, self-paced reading paradigm, 
individual differences 
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Individual differences and emotional inferences during reading comprehension 
 Research on reading comprehension has shown that readers build mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) or situation models (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) of a scene depicted in a 
text that comprise both explicit and implicit elements. The latter are based on general 
knowledge and are referred to as inferences. Inferences generated during reading are often 
considered necessary to allow readers to maintain a certain local as well as global coherence 
of the text (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). Those establishing or maintaining local 
coherence connect adjacent constituents of the text, whereas those establishing or maintaining 
global coherence connect most constituents of the text by deeper features such as the theme of 
a narrative. The construction of a mental model is incremental, as readers continually update 
their representations with new information, either explicit or implicit (Garnham & Oakhill, 
1996). If mental models can be relatively complex, they are nonetheless most likely tributary 
to readers’ limited processing capacities (e.g., Baddeley, 1996), which may limit possible 
inferences as the text is being processed (i.e., on-line). Not surprisingly, research on 
inferences has repeatedly tried to identify which inferences are made on-line, and which are 
not, leading to a certain controversy on the actual need to make certain inferences.  
 In this paper, we focus on the mental representation readers construct of the affective 
state of the main character in short narratives, which has typically been subject to controversy 
as to whether it was inferred on-line or not. If some theories suggest that this type of inference 
may not be drawn during reading (e.g., the minimalist view of reading from McKoon and 
Rattcliff, 1992), others consider it essential for global coherence, giving it an on-line status 
(e.g., the constructionist view of reading by Graesser et al., 1994). Although of prime concern 
in early research on the matter, the relevance of these theories has been questioned with 
regards to the complexity of the processes involved in emotional inferences (e.g., Gygax, 
Tapiero, & Carruzzo, 2007). Most importantly, and this paper furthers this idea, individual 
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differences may well modulate the actual integration and complexity of the main character's 
emotional status in readers' mental models. 
 Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, and Robertson (1992) were among the first to conduct a 
series of experiments investigating readers' ability to mentally represent the main character’s 
emotional status described in short narratives. In their first two experiments, presenting 
participants with different narratives portraying emotion-eliciting situations, they found that 
target sentences were read significantly faster when they contained matching emotion terms 
than when they contained mismatching emotion terms of opposite valence (Experiment 1) or 
similar valence (Experiment 2). Gernsbacher et al. (1992) concluded that readers do integrate 
specific emotions in their mental models while reading. These findings have been further 
supported by other studies investigating readers' inclusion of the main characters' affective 
status in their mental models (Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Gernsbacher, 
Robertson, Palladino, & Werner, 2004; de Vega, Leon, & Diaz, 1996).  
 Using short stories based on Gernsbacher et al. (1992), Gygax, Oakhill, and Garnham 
(2003) and Gygax, Garnham, and Oakhill (2004) questioned the assumed notion of specificity 
(i.e., readers infer a specific emotion label and differentiate between similar emotions or 
merely infer a broader feeling). They showed that although participants were sensitive to 
congruence manipulations of target sentences containing emotion words (i.e., they read 
sentences containing congruent target emotion words faster than incongruent ones), they were 
equally fast when reading target sentences containing (a) Gernsbacher et al.'s initial emotion 
words (e.g., depressed), (b) emotion words synonymous to the original ones in Gernsbacher et 
al. (e.g., miserable) and (c) emotional terms that were merely similar to them (e.g., useless). 
Most importantly, these findings were independent of the length of the narratives, reflected in 
the amount of information given about the main protagonist's emotional status (Gygax et al., 
2004). 
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Gygax et al. (2007) tried to give an explanation to account for such a seemingly non-
specific representation of the main character's emotional status. Their core argument was that 
most readers, under normal conditions, may only include part(s) of the emotion construct in 
their mental models. By emotion construct, the authors referred to Scherer’s (e.g., 1987, 
2005) definition of an emotion as a process of coordinated changes in the five organismic 
subsystems (information processing, support, executive, action, and monitoring), resulting 
from the appraisal of an event, internal or external. Each subsystem is associated with a 
particular component of emotion (i.e., cognitive, psychophysiological, action tendency, motor 
expression, or subjective feeling), the sum of all component changes resulting in a specific 
emotion. Although a more detailed account of this theory goes beyond the scope of this paper, 
as the construction process is dynamic and cumulative (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), Gygax 
and colleagues (2003, 2004, 2007) suggested that when reading about emotional situations, 
readers may well build a representation of emotion in an incremental manner but not 
inevitably reach some specific emotion (or specific emotion label such as sad or happy). The 
latter stage only appears if all necessary components are presented in the text or implied by it, 
or under critical conditions, some of which are examined in the present study. Under normal 
reading conditions, and if the text is rather under-specified, readers might only include the 
core and easy-to-represent elements of the main protagonist’s emotional response. Among 
these elements, valence may be a good candidate, although not on its own (Gernsbacher et al., 
1992), as well as behavioral responses (i.e., similar to Scherer’s action tendency or motor 
expressions) elicited by the emotional situation. By behavioral responses the authors referred 
to any movement, or reference to movement in response to the emotion-eliciting situation. For 
example, someone might clench their fist in response to a frustrating situation or freeze in 
response to a scary one. Gygax et al. (2007) suggested that behavioral responses were easier 
to infer, at least easier than a fairly complex and abstract representation of emotion. To test 
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this, they presented participants with stories in which the main character was experiencing an 
emotion-eliciting situation. The final target sentence of each story comprised either an 
emotion word, congruent or incongruent, as in previous research, or some congruent or 
incongruent information about the physical behavior of the main character (see Table 1 for an 
example).  
 Results indicated a significantly larger congruence effect in the behavior condition 
compared to the emotion condition, suggesting faster processing of congruent behavioral 
information as well as slower processing of incongruent one. Gygax et al. (2007) added a 
specific control condition for what they called the context integration problem. In short, they 
argued that differences between reading times of sentences containing congruent information 
and sentences containing incongruent information might not necessarily mirror inferential 
processes, as previously assumed. When reading the sentence The weather is nice, readers 
might infer that the sun is shining, but it is unlikely, under normal circumstances, that they 
infer some information about, let's say, taking the train. However, Gygax et al. (2007) argued 
that after the sentence The weather is nice, the sentence John is taking the train should still be 
read faster than It is very dark (which is incongruent), maybe in the same way that congruent 
emotions are read faster than incongruent ones. The former effect (i.e., John is taking the 
train vs. It is very dark), although similar to effects that have led researchers to believe in 
inferential processes, might just mirror integration processes, meaning that as long as the 
sentence does not contradict the context, readers maintain a fast reading pace (see Gygax et 
al., 2007 for a more complete argumentation). Table 2 shows an example of the control 
condition. 
 The results of the control condition were very similar (i.e., congruence effect) to the 
ones found in the emotion label condition, but much smaller than the difference found in the 
behavioral condition, hinting at the idea that emotion labels were not necessarily included in 
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readers’ mental representations of emotions, and that some behavioral information was likely 
included in readers’ mental representations. Gygax et al. (2007) further suggested that such 
information was connected to what could be referred to as an emotion construct. In essence, 
readers construct a representation foundation, formed of stereotypical, or common 
information (i.e., behavioral reaction) associated with the emotion realm. This last point is 
particularly important, as Gygax (2010) showed that such a behavioral inference was not to be 
mistaken with any behavioral inference, independent of emotional content. They showed that 
although readers do generate behavioral inferences such as picking up after the sentence John 
saw a penny on the floor, they still showed higher congruent vs. incongruent effects in the 
emotion behavioral condition. 
 In all, these results suggest that (a) readers do infer emotional information during 
reading, but (b) the components included in readers' mental models are only a part of a more 
complex emotion construct. Given this idea of complexity, it seems reasonable to assume that 
there might be individual differences that may affect the construction of more elaborate 
emotional inferences. In the present paper, we tested this idea by specifically focusing on 
factors that could lead readers to form a more complex and abstract representation of 
emotions. Specifically, we attempted to identify three factors that may affect the elaboration 
of complex representations of emotions: (a) simulation, (b) empathy and (c) processing 
limitations (i.e., working memory). The first two, although based on different constructs (e.g., 
Tan, 1994), are directly associated with the possible ways people understand emotions, and 
the last one is related to more general cognitive functions. We do not have any strong 
evidence to assume interactions between these factors. For example, to our knowledge, the 
link between empathy and working memory has been quite difficult to establish (e.g., Hansen, 
2011). We therefore only present specific predictions as to their respective effects on 
emotional inferences. 
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  Simulation and Empathy 
In this paper, we embrace the idea, introduced by Oatley (1994), that through 
simulation (to differentiate from empathy, as discussed later), readers identify with the 
characters and dynamically adopt their goals and actions through their own planning process. 
This is a creative process by which readers map their own emotional responses onto those of 
the characters. It also mirrors Goldie's (1999) suggestion that people can understand emotion 
through in-his-shoes imagining, projecting their own beliefs and thoughts onto the character.  
Simulation processes have been shown to be relevant in psycholinguistics, as the way 
individuals perceive real-world situations may have a large effect on word interpretation 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Situation models may hence be defined as experiential (perception and 
action) simulations of described situations (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004). Recent empirical 
evidence converges in suggesting that comprehenders can be viewed as immersed 
experiencers: readers experience information as if they were participating in the activity 
described (Zwaan, 1999a, 1999b, 2004; Zwaan & Rapp, 2006).  
We believe that forcing an experiential way of reading may reinforce the behavioral 
component of the emotional inference generated during reading. More specifically, we expect 
the congruency difference (i.e., congruent faster than incongruent) between the emotional and 
the behavioral component conditions found in Gygax et al. (2007) to be more pronounced 
under simulation enforcement than under no specific simulation instructions. To evaluate this 
issue, we enforced readers in simulation processes by giving participants explicit instructions 
to simulate the narratives, i.e., to put themselves in the main character's shoes. 
However, if we believe that enforced simulation processes could result in a more 
pronounced representation of behavioral information, empathic readers may construct 
complex representations of emotions including more specific emotional labels, regardless of 
simulation processes.  
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Tan (1994) suggested that through empathy, which does not require the readers to 
share similar feelings as the protagonist (i.e., which they do when simulating), readers easily 
understand and imagine the main protagonist’s emotional status. If, according to Goldie 
(1999), readers can maintain a certain observer's position when involved in empathic 
processes, they still anticipate how the main protagonist is going to behave and how he or she 
is going to feel. Some researchers on emotional inferences have strongly suggested that 
empathy was an important factor in the representation of emotions during reading (e.g., 
Komeda & Kusumi, 2006). More empathic readers may therefore build complex 
representations of emotions. Again, by complex, we essentially mean that the mental models 
built by readers incorporate more elements of the emotion construct (i.e., not just behavioral 
elements) the sum of which may even activate specific emotional labels. If empathy has a role 
in the complexity of readers’ mental representation of the main protagonist’s emotional status, 
we expect that a measure of empathy (e.g., Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980, 1983) 
should enable us to associate different levels of empathy with differences in the complexity of 
emotional inferences. In essence, compared to the low empathic readers, we expect the more 
empathic ones to show an increased congruency effect in the emotion condition (i.e., more 
specifically emotion label inference) even to the extent of resembling the strong congruency 
effect in the behavioral condition.  
Inherently, however, the very notion of disparity in the elaboration of mental models 
also raises issues of processing capacities, independent, or in conjunction with the empathic 
or simulation processes that readers may trigger.  
  Processing Limitations: Working Memory Capacities 
Although this issue was never explicitly explored, the unspecific nature of emotional 
inferences suggested by Gygax and colleagues (2003, 2004, and to a certain extent 2007) 
could have been an artifact of readers’ limited working memory capacity. This assumption 
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relies on the critical idea that the mental representation of a text is partly computed and stored 
in working memory (Just & Carpenter, 1992). In fact, Estevez and Calvo (2000) found that 
the time it took participants to generate elaborative inferences (i.e., inferences that are not 
essentially needed for coherence) depended on their working memory capacity. As readers 
with poor working memory capacity encounter new sentences or group of sentences, they 
may not have enough time to generate the inferences attached to the preceding sentences. 
Accordingly, readers do not always generate these elaborative inferences. If they do so, the 
inferences might be neither strong nor specific. In the same line of thinking, van den Broek, 
Young, Tzeng, and Linderholm (1999) suggested that readers have a limited amount of 
possible activation available. This means that the number and specificity of possible 
inferences made while reading is limited. Even if readers make the appropriate inferences, the 
specificity of some previously activated inferences might still diminish as readers encounter 
new words, sentences or propositions.  
If one considers that readers, as suggested earlier, engaging in an experiential way of 
reading may have an accentuated representation of behavioral elements, we could hypothesize 
that both general working memory and visuo-spatial working memory may play a role in the 
elaboration of these inferences, though a different one.  
On the one hand, visuo-spatial working memory limitations may hinder a 
representation of behavioral elements, because both visuo-spatial working memory and the 
conceptual representation of sensory elements share the same sensory space (Vermeulen, 
Corneille & Niedenthal, 2008). This is of course based on the premise that behavioral 
elements of emotional inferences are sensory based. Interestingly, except for research focused 
on spatial text processing (Meneghetti, Gyselinck, Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2009), the impact of 
visuo-spatial working memory capacities on reading comprehension has not received much 
support (e.g., Oakhill, Yuill & Garnham, 2011). Still, we believe that to transpose themselves 
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in the main character’s shoes and experience each situation, readers might activate different 
visual and spatial processes relying on their visuo-spatial working memory capacities. Those 
with higher visuo-spatial working memory scores may therefore show an accentuated 
prominence of behavioral information, reflected in an even more pronounced congruency 
effect in the behavioral condition compare to the emotional one.  
On the other hand, better general working memory scores may result in a more 
elaborate and complex representation of emotion (i.e., readers have more resources to process 
all emotion components), signaled by an increased congruency effect in the emotion condition 
(i.e., more specific emotion label). 
Method 
The present experiment was composed of three phases. The first phase comprised the 
main experiment (self-paced reading task), divided in two parts corresponding to the two 
different simulation conditions. In Part I, no specific instructions except that of reading the 
texts at a natural pace were given to the participants. In Part II, participants were asked to 
simulate, that is to imagine themselves in the main character’s shoes. Each participant did 
both parts. The second phase was aimed at the evaluation of each participant’s working 
memory capacities, both general and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. In the third 
and final phase, we evaluated each participant’s level of empathy. 
Participants 
Eighty-six students (57 women and 29 men) from the University of Fribourg took part 
in this experiment for course credits. All participants were native French speakers. Due to 
unusually aberrant long reading times (i.e., several reading times above eight seconds for 
three- to four-words sentences), three participants were removed from the analyses. They 
obviously did not understand the instructions.  
Materials 
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Experimental stories. Twenty-four stories, in French, from Gygax and Tapiero 
(2003) were used in this experiment. To construct these stories, Gygax and Tapiero (2003) 
tried to distance themselves from the habitual way stories are set up in this line of research. 
Most often, these stories are created by having researchers initially write (intuitive) stories 
that involve the main protagonist in some emotion triggering situation and then asking 
“judges” to agree on whether the stories rightly encompass the emotional situations (e.g., 
Gernsbacher et al., 1992; de Vega et al., 1996). This procedure offers researchers a certain 
control over linguistic factors such as frequency or syntactic properties of the sentences they 
create, although the content of the stories may not encompass the most complete, or salient 
description of emotions (or emotion situations), at least not for the population under scrutiny. 
Instead of creating the stories themselves, Gygax and Tapiero (2003) directly asked 30 
students to each generate 24 stories focused on specific given emotions. A categorical 
analysis of participants’ responses enabled the authors to construct 24 stereotypical stories 
using the most recurrent categories and the most salient wording. Although it meant that the 
control over certain linguistic factors was more difficult, the resulting stories corresponded – 
semantically as well as in the particular wording of the constituent sentences – more 
accurately to the population under investigation (see Table 1 for an example story).  
As others have done (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992; Gygax et al., 2003, 2004), in our 
materials, each emotion (i.e., each story) was paired with it’s opposite (sad - happy). Each 
story was present in four different versions, depending on the target sentence. The target 
sentence contained a matching emotion, a mismatching emotion (from its opposite story), a 
matching behavioral description or a mismatching behavioral description (from its opposite 
story). Eight lists were constructed, to ensure that each participant would see all conditions 
without (Part I) and with (Part II) simulation instructions, and that each passage was present 
in each simulation condition across the experiment. This means that in four lists, a particular 
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passage appeared in Part I and in the other four lists in Part II. In each of these four lists, it 
appeared with a different target sentence. A participant was presented with one of the eight 
lists and saw a narrative only once.  
Filler stories. Twenty-four filler passages from Gygax et al. (2007) were also used. 
Out of the twenty-four filler stories, twelve were used to test the neutral match/mismatch 
question mentioned earlier. Six of these stories had a matching second sentence and six had a 
mismatching second sentence. In the latter case, the rest of the story was written so as to 
clarify the ambiguity raised by the presence of mismatching information (see Table 2 for 
examples of filler stories). We used the second sentence as the target sentence to ensure that 
the matching neutral information was unlikely to have been incorporated in readers’ mental 
representations of the text (i.e., after just one sentence). A pilot study (in Gygax et al., 2007) 
ensured that the matching neutral sentences were indeed neutral and that the mismatching 
sentences were considered mismatching given the context. 
In total, forty-eight passages were presented to each participant. In each simulation 
part of the experiment, there were twelve experimental stories, six experimental filler stories 
and six normal filler stories. For each participant, these were presented in a random order.  
The stories were presented on a Power Macintosh 4400 using Psyscope Software 
(Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Responses to the target sentences of each 
story were collected using a response button box attached to the computer, which permits 
millisecond accuracy. 
Working memory tests. Two working memory tests were used in this study. First, 
participants’ general working memory was evaluated with Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) 
French version of the Reading Span Test (RST) (Delaloye, Ludwig, Borella, Chicherio, & de 
Ribaupierre, 2007). Second, participants’ visuo-spatial working memory was assessed using a 
standardized version of Corsi Block-Tapping Task (Kessels, van Zandvoort, Postma, 
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Kappelle, & de Haan, 2000). In this task, the experimenter presents participants with a small 
platform composed of nine blocks. The experimenter then taps particular sequences of blocks, 
which participants have to reproduce. The initial sequence is composed of only two blocks. If 
participants reproduce correctly one of two sequences of the same length, they are presented 
with a sequence in which one block is added. If none is reproduced correctly, the number of 
correct blocks reproduced last is taken as a measure of participants' visuo-spatial working 
memory span. The total score is the product of the span and the number of correct trials. 
Empathy scale. Each participant’s level of empathy was assessed with a French 
version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)1 of Davis (1980, 1983). Composed of 
twenty-eight items, this questionnaire measures four components of empathy: Empathic 
Concern, Perspective Taking, Fantasy and Personal Distress. The Perspective-Taking scale 
and the Fantasy scale represent the cognitive facet of empathy and respectively measure the 
tendency to adopt the psychological point of view of others and the tendency to transpose 
themselves into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters. The Empathic Concern scale 
and the Personal Distress scale represent the emotional facets of empathy and measure other-
oriented and self-oriented feelings. The total score of empathy was calculated by summing the 
Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking and Fantasy scales, as proposed by Pulos, Elison and 
Lennon (2004). The higher the score, the more empathic a participant is. 
Procedure 
Each story was presented one sentence at a time. As in Gygax et al. (2007), 
participants were instructed to read each sentence at a normal reading speed, as if they were at 
home, reading a magazine. They were asked to press the yes button when they finished 
reading a sentence, resulting in the next sentence appearing on the screen after 500 
milliseconds. To make sure that participants read the story carefully, some stories (n = 16) 
were followed by a question related to the text. Participants answered the question by pressing 
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either the yes or no button. After the presentation of a passage, participants were prompted 
with the message Are you ready? followed by the next passage. Before the actual experiment, 
participants underwent a practice session made up of three passages. 
After completion of Part I (no specific instructions to simulate), participants were 
asked to rate, on an 8-point scale (0 = no simulation at all to 7 = totally engaged in a 
simulation process), the extent to which they tried to naturally simulate the stories. After 
completing the scale, they were informed that similar stories would appear on the screen, but 
this time, they were explicitly asked to mentally simulate the situations presented to them. 
More specifically, we told them to make an effort to put themselves in the protagonist’s 
shoes, as if they were living the story from the inside. At the end of Part II, participants filled 
the 8-points scale again, to ensure that participants complied with the instructions.  
The order no instructions to simulate  instructions to simulate was fixed, as the 
reversed order would have made little sense, as any resulting lack of effect would be 
imputable to a spill-over effect. Conversely, a fixed order has the disadvantage of 
confounding a possible order effect by which a particular condition might be altered whereas 
another one might not. To ensure that this would not be the case, we examined Gygax et al.’s 
(2007) data by splitting them into two parts. As shown in Figure 1, both parts showed the 
exact same pattern in terms of the central conditions (Emotion and Behavior) and in terms of 
the differences in (residual) reading times between congruent and incongruent information, 
ruling out any confounding order effect that have had targeted the central conditions 
differently. 
Participants’ working memory capacities were then evaluated with the RST followed 
by the Corsi Test. Finally, participants filled in the IRI questionnaire. 
  Results 
Data Transformation 
Running head: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND EMOTIONAL INFERENCES  16
Reading times collected in the self-paced reading task were first transformed in order 
to allow for individual differences in reading speed as well as to allow for the fact that all 
target sentences were not in the same position in the text nor of the same length. The 
transformation procedure was inspired by Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Garnsey (1994) and 
Gygax et al. (2007). For each participant, a regression equation of time (i.e., reading time) 
against length (i.e., number of characters in the target sentence) was produced, separately for 
the 2nd (control condition) and 5th (experimental conditions) sentences. Residual reading 
times were calculated by subtracting the actual reading times from the reading times predicted 
by the regression equation. A negative residual time means that the reading time was longer 
than expected. Figure 2 shows the residual reading times for the different conditions (without 
considering individual differences). Two emotion target sentences and two behavior target 
sentences were removed from the analyses as they showed an awkward reverse congruence 
effect, hinting that their content was considered highly ambiguous by our participants. 
We present the analyses in two parts. We initially present a first model that is 
comparable to Gygax et al. (2007). In essence, as Gygax et al. (2007) did not account for 
individual differences, we wanted to match our data to theirs first. We then present analyses 
that take individual differences into account. As this paper was exclusively concerned with 
individual differences, all analyses were conducted considering participants as random factor. 
In all analysis sections, when the main or interaction effects are not reported, it means that 
they were not significant.  
Inference Elaboration – First model 
A general 2 (Simulation: With vs. Without Simulation) X 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. 
Behavior vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the residual reading times showed a main effect of Congruence, F(1, 82) = 
105.37, p < .001, congruent sentences being read on average 450 milliseconds faster than 
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incongruent ones, and an interaction effect of Nature by Congruence, F(2, 164) = 7.52, p < 
.001. There was no other main or interaction effect. Our simulation manipulation did not 
produce any of the expected effects, even if the participants reported having simulated much 
more in Part II (M = 5.51) than in Part I (M = 2.96), t(80) = 13.62, p < .01.  
We explored the source of the Nature by Congruence interaction effect - the main 
focus of Gygax et al. (2007) - in separate follow-up ANOVAs. In all follow-up analyses, F-
values were calculated using the original model error term (Kirk, 1995). Degrees of freedom 
were adapted accordingly. All p-values were also converted to account for multiple 
comparisons (i.e., Bonferroni corrections). In the first follow-up we compared the emotion 
and behavior conditions in terms of congruency. For this purpose, we examined the 
interaction of Congruence with respect to two of the three values of the Nature variable. A 2 
(Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated 
measure ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect, F(1, 164) = 6.30, p < .017. A 
second follow-up ANOVA showed a significant 2 (Nature: Control vs. Behavior) X 2 
(Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) interaction effect, F(1, 164) = 14.56, p < . 017. 
Finally, there was no 2 (Nature: Emotion vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: Congruent vs. 
Incongruent) interaction effect, F(1, 164) = 1.70, p = .19. This means, as shown in Figure 2, 
that the difference between reading times of congruent and incongruent sentences was greater 
in the behavior condition (624 ms) than in the Control (310 ms) and the Emotion condition 
(416 ms). These results perfectly matched those found by Gygax et al. (2007). This is true 
even to the extent of the slight numerical difference between the emotion and the control 
condition (which will be most apparent when examining the visuo-spatial individual 
differences). No further post hoc analyses were performed on each condition’s simple 
congruence effect. Essentially, they would all be significant. The crucial comparison is 
between the experimental conditions’ congruence effects and the control condition’s 
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congruence effect, the latter representing a simple context yet non-inferential effect (as 
stressed by Gygax et al., 2007). 
Further analyses were done in order to reveal any influence of participants’ 
characteristics on emotional inference elaboration. Since we did not expect them to interact in 
the influence that they may have on emotional inference elaboration, each variable related to 
participants’ characteristics was added individually to the main 2 (Simulation: With vs. 
Without Simulation) X 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior vs. Control) X 2 (Congruence: 
Congruent vs. Incongruent) analysis. Different models were tested, each by running separate 
ANOVAs. 
Inference Elaboration - Individual differences 
To investigate the role of individual differences, we explored the data by conducting 
hierarchical clusters on each of our measures using Ward's Method (see Table 3 for a 
summary of all individual differences scores). This method enabled us to classify participants 
in a meaningful way - more than with a manual split at least, where participants have to be 
shifted relatively subjectively to one of the group -, as it maximizes similarity of members of 
a group according to the scores of each individual on a particular scale. Ward’s method is 
distinct from all other clustering methods because it uses an analysis of variance approach to 
evaluate the distances between the clusters. Basically, a score is entered into a cluster if it 
results in a minimal increase of the error sum of squares. In sum, Ward’s method minimizes 
the total within-cluster variance whilst maximizing the between-cluster variance (Ward, 
1963). Subsequent analyses were tested with two groups, except if stated otherwise. All 
cluster analyses are briefly presented, but only significant impact to the initial 2 (Simulation) 
X 3 (Nature) X 2 (Congruence) analysis are presented. 
 General working memory. The cluster analysis on the proportion of RST correct 
items revealed two uneven groups, reflecting a skewed distribution (supported by a -.70 
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skewness value): a higher RST group (n = 63) with a mean of .76 (SD = .09) and a lower 
group (n = 20) with a mean of .46 (SD = .09). The two groups were significantly different (Ws 
= 210, z = -6.77, p < .001). When introduced in the initial model as an independent variable, 
no effect other than those found without the variable was apparent. Due to its particular 
distribution and uneven sample sizes, we extracted the lower group participants and 
conducted another classification procedure. If this latter did improve sample sizes, with a 
higher RST group (n = 31) with a mean of .84 (SD = .04) and a lower group (n = 32) with a 
mean of .68 (SD = .05), both group were quite similar (.3 SD under and .6 SD above the 
standard score). Therefore, and although significantly different, t(61) = 13.76, p < .001, their 
inclusion to the model did not affect it2.  
Visuo-spatial working memory. The cluster analysis on total scores revealed a high 
Corsi group (n = 33) with a mean of 78.61 (SD = 9.50) and a low Corsi group (n = 50) with a 
mean of 49.14 (SD = 11.43) bearing significant difference (Ws = 1275, z = -7.74, p < .001). 
When introduced in the initial model as an independent variable, there was an additional 2 
(Simulation) X 3 (Nature) X 2 (Congruence) X 2 (Corsi) interaction effect, F(2, 162) = 4.59, 
p < .05 (see Figure 3). Interestingly, when conducting two follow-up ANOVAs to examine 
individually the two Corsi groups, the low Corsi group was only affected by congruence, as 
shown by a significant Congruence effect, F(1, 81) = 59.36, p < .025, but no other main nor 
interaction effect. On the other hand, and compared to the first model analysis, the high Corsi 
group showed an additional Simulation by Nature by Congruence interaction effect, F(2, 162) 
= 4.27, p < .025. When examining this interaction more closely in a follow-up ANOVA, there 
was a Nature by Congruence effect only significant in Part II, F(2, 162) = 8.64, p < .025, 
qualified by a Nature (Behavior vs. Emotion) by Congruence interaction effect, F(1, 162) = 
13.41, p < .017, and a Nature (Behavior vs. Control) by Congruence interaction effect, F(1, 
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162) = 12.51, p < .017,  but no Nature (Emotion vs. Control) by Congruence interaction 
effect. 
The Simulation manipulation seems to have affected the two groups differently. If the 
low Corsi group seems to have been mainly affected by congruence, independent of the 
conditions, the high Corsi group seems to have been influenced by the manipulation in our 
central conditions (Emotion and Behavior). Although no nature by congruence effect was 
apparent in the first part of the experiment, it changed in the second part, the congruence 
effect being much bigger in the Behavior condition in the second Part (901 ms) than in the 
first Part (568 ms), and than in the Emotion condition (227 ms). This is in line with the idea 
that situation models include perceptual components (Glenberg, 1999; Glenberg, Meyer, & 
Lindem, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983) and that the ability to integrate elaborative and 
predictive inferences during reading depends upon visuo-spatial resources (Fincher-Kiefer, 
2001; Fincher-Kiefer & D’Agostino, 2004). Readers' situation models are perceptual in 
nature, and readers build them on the basis of their own perceptual analogous experiences. As 
in our experiment, when simulating, high visuo-spatial span participants may have relied on a 
greater capacity to embody themselves in the stories, thus leading them to a stronger 
representation of behavioral elements.  
Still, note that in the Emotion condition, the congruence effect actually decreased from 
Part I to Part II (i.e., from 584 to 227 ms) for the high Corsi group. In fact, the source of this 
effect is mainly in Part I, where the Emotion congruence effect is similar to the Behavior one. 
This might explain the general trend of a slight global numerical difference between the 
Emotion and the Control condition.   
Empathy level. The cluster analysis revealed two groups: a higher Empathy group (n 
= 45) with a mean of 80.84 (SD = 6.30) and a lower group (n = 38) with a mean of 62.05 (SD 
= 7.96). Although both quite high, hinting as for the RST at a skewed distribution (supported 
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by a -.51 skewness value), they were significantly different (Ws = 741, z = -7.82, p < .001). 
When introduced in the initial model as an independent variable and contrary to our 
expectations, no effect other than those found without the variable was apparent. As for the 
RST measure, different splitting strategies were adopted, none bearing any different pattern of 
results (see footnote #2).  
 Discussion 
 Gygax et al. (2007) found evidence that when reading narratives about a protagonist in 
an emotion eliciting situation, readers tend to build a representation of the main protagonist’s 
emotional response which favors behavioral information (over emotions per se). In this 
experiment, we wanted to further their findings by examining circumstances that would 
intensify or reduce this process.  We were particularly interested in individual differences that 
could account for the results found in Gygax et al. (2007). More specifically, we investigated 
whether the elaboration of emotional inferences was associated to particular identification 
processes, as defined by simulation or empathy, or to processing limitations, as defined by 
different types of working memory limitations.  
 If our results supported the idea that readers were in general more likely to include 
behavioral information than emotions per se in their mental representations of the text (as 
previously shown), we only found limited contributions from the different factors under 
scrutiny. In other words, the processes identified by Gygax et al. (2007) may well be stable 
and generalizable across a wide range of readers and reading strategies (e.g., simulation). If 
null effects are often delicate to interpret, we would still like to propose a discussion of the 
underlying processes that might explain the general lack of influence of these factors. This 
discussion may set the very foundations of future investigations on emotional inferences and 
may direct researchers interested in the matter towards most relevant issues.  
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 Before entering into the heart of this discussion, it is important to present the one 
factor that seemed to explain part of the variance of our simulation manipulation. More 
specifically, if our simulation manipulation did not show the expected general pattern, and 
this will be discussed later, our measure of visuo-spatial working memory showed that this 
general trend was not stable across participants with different visuo-spatial working memory 
capacities. Most importantly, the behavioral component of high visuo-spatial span 
participants' mental model seemed to have benefited from our simulation manipulation, 
whereas this was not the case for low visuo-spatial span participants. When asked to simulate, 
high visuo-spatial span participants showed increased sensitivity to target sentences 
containing behavioral elements. This supports the idea that simulating text increases the 
likelihood of including behavioral elements in readers' mental model, even if this only seems 
to be true for high visuo-spatial span readers. It also supports the broader notion that visuo-
spatial capacities are crucial when generating elaborative inferences (e.g., Fincher-Kiefer, 
2001; Fincher-Kiefer & D’Agostino, 2004) and that, at least for some participants, when 
compelled to be actors in the text (i.e., in our study through a simulation manipulation), 
perceptual and motor information may show access and encoding facilitation (Ditman, 
Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010). Note that the present data cannot truly disentangle the 
detailed processes that influence visuo-spatial working memory, but at least they suggest that 
visuo-spatial working memory is a serious candidate when examining processes at stake in 
emotional inferences and reading comprehension.  
 Even though low- and high- visuo-spatial participants showed differential simulation 
effects, the main Nature by Congruence effect remained, suggesting that low visuo-spatial 
span participants still favored behavioral information to emotions per se (i.e., regardless of 
simulation). This strongly suggests that readers transpose themselves in the protagonist’s 
shoes during reading, even when no specific instructions to do so are given to them, leading to 
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a stronger behavioral representation of the situation. In a sense, this is not surprising, 
considering that to understand a text and the main protagonist’s mental states, readers 
automatically lay upon their own psycho-physiological resources to imagine themselves 
living the same story and performing the same actions as the protagonist (e.g., Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Goldman, 2002; Mouilso, Glenberg, & Havas, 2007; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & 
Taylor, 2006). By simulating, readers substitute their own feelings for those of the protagonist 
(Goldman, 2005) and can access knowledge of what is described in the text and elaborate a 
mental representation based on this knowledge. Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, and 
Vermeulen (2009) and Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) further argued that the process of 
simulation is necessary to access emotional meaning and elaborate mental representations of 
emotional texts.  
In some respects, one could argue that the general lack of effect of our simulation 
manipulation reflects a ceiling effect, all participants being more or less already engaged in 
simulation processes. This is compared with research suggesting that even passive reading of 
action-related words already activates motor- and premotor-associated brain regions (e.g., 
Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004), implying rather spontaneous simulation processes. 
A ceiling effect might also exist for both our empathy and our general working 
memory measures. Low- and high-empathy participants, as well as low- and high- general 
working memory participants showed all relatively high scores, at least compared to standards 
scores. In addition to this, empathy might be connected to simulation processes, some authors 
arguing that empathy and simulation are difficult to disentangle (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; 
Goldman, 2005; Preston & de Waal, 2002). If our results suggest that working memory and 
empathy may not be accountable for the relative lack of elaboration, it should be stressed that 
the groups of participants were quite similar. 
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These probable ceiling effects raise two crucial issues. First, they raise the pertinence 
of a constant reliance on university students as participants. Some measures may not be most 
appropriate with regard to undergraduate students' characteristics. Second, and on a more 
conceptual level, they do support the fact that complex elaboration of emotions might not be 
present when inferring emotions, even for participants with relative high levels of empathy, 
simulation processes and working memory. According to Gygax et al. (2007), the apparent 
dominance of behavioral information in readers' mental models can be explained by different 
factors, all based on the perspective that behavioral elements are more easily activated and 
included in readers' mental models. First, they argued that readers do not need to construct 
elaborate and complex representations to attain a reasonable understanding of the text. This is 
in line with the idea found in research on text comprehension that underspecified 
representations of text are often perfectly acceptable (e.g., Sanford & Graesser, 2006), and 
that good enough representations (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) may in the long term be 
beneficial in terms of cognitive load. In essence, it might even be counterproductive for 
readers to automatically integrate elaborate and complex representations of the main 
protagonist’s emotional status, as any potential shifts may involve a large amount of cognitive 
processing. Second, if one considers the main function of emotions to prepare the body for the 
appropriate actions (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1982), readers, through simulation, will most likely 
activate neural areas that are implicated in actions associated with the described emotions 
(Havas et al., 2007). Such an activation, in turn, will lead readers to the construction of mental 
representations mostly composed of behavioral characteristics.  
Although these two explanations coincide with our results, we still believe that some 
situations may elicit more elaborate representations of emotions. If behavioral elements are 
well-suited candidates for the representation of the protagonist’s emotional status, as 
explained above, there may still be textual elements that elicit elaborate emotions. These 
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textual elements have in fact been difficult to explore, as the narratives used in the present 
study, as well as in studies of others, although more or less ecological, were never structured 
in a consistent manner regarding the quality and quantity of emotional information they 
conveyed. Typically, Scherer and his colleagues (e.g., 1984, 2005) identified different 
emotion sub-components which combination is necessary to produce specific emotional 
responses. In this paper, as well as in most research on emotional inferences, we may not have 
paid enough attention to the emotion components that the passages contained. The present 
results may be, in terms of the lack of specific emotional inferences, the direct result of such 
an issue, which may also have impacted upon the relatively moderate effects of our individual 
differences. We are currently investigating this very issue in our laboratory. 
On a different yet related methodological note, the present experiment, as others 
before, was based on the habitual match vs. mismatch or congruent vs. incongruent paradigm. 
Fundamentally, this could be the cause of some of the null effects found in this experiment for 
two main reasons. First of all, in case of a match vs. mismatch effect, it is always difficult to 
know if the effect is mainly associated with the incongruent information (i.e., as you often 
find in EEG studies on the N400, for example) or with the congruent one. Second, in self-
paced reading experiments, match vs. mismatch effects are often quite important in terms of 
milliseconds (e.g., 200 milliseconds minimum), suggesting that the paradigm may not be 
sensitive to small changes of processes, as they may have appeared in this experiment.   
Finally, we can not exclude the fact that the null effects reported here result from a 
lack of statistical power. Our results would benefit from a replication with a greater sample, 
as the differences between the conditions examined in this paper may have been too subtle to 
be demonstrated given the relative small number of participants (still higher than most of the 
studies on the topic) and the different variables under observation. 
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In conclusion, the experiment presented in this paper confirmed previous findings 
(e.g., Gygax, 2010) on the unspecific nature of emotional inferences and on the prevalence of 
behavioral elements in readers' mental models of emotions. It also showed that visuo-spatial 
memory capacities might influence such predominance, but that general working memory, 
empathy capacities and reading preference were not of prime importance in those inferential 
processes. 
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Footnotes 
1 Free translation, not validated, available from Stephanie Braun (sbraun@ulb.ac.be), 
ULB – Erasme Hospital, Brussels, Belgium. 
2 To ensure that the null results were not due to our categorization procedure, we also 
performed extra analyses adopting different strategies: (a) we used three clusters and (b) we 
split the data into quartiles and compared high and low quartiles. None of these bore any 
consequence on the analyses presented in this paper. These different strategies were also 
adopted with other variables when relevant. For the Empathy scale, we also tested each of its 
four sub-components separately, but nothing came of these different analyses. We also 
ensured that the null results were not due to a questionable reliability of the IRI sub-scales. 
This was not the case, all Cronbach's α being higher than .7. 
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Table 1 
Example of an experimental narrative used in Gygax et al. (2007) and in this experiment 
Narrative: 
Suzanne came back from her regular visit to the nursing home. She walked slowly from the 
nursing home to her place. She thought of the days with her grandmother with a heavy heart. 
She had trouble holding back her tears when thinking of her grandmother alone in her room. 
 
Target sentences: 
Matching emotion:         As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling sad. 
Mismatching emotion:   As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling happy. 
Matching behavior:        She sat on her settee, wrapped in a blanket. 
Mismatching behavior: She danced all night, as she was always the one to show others how 
to party. 
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Table 2 
Examples of control narratives used in Gygax et al. (2007) and in this experiment. In the first 
narrative, the second sentence is the congruent neutral target sentence and in the second 
narrative, the second sentence is the incongruent neutral target sentence. 
Narrative 1: Neutral matching 
Georges was writing and preparing for a conference in the East. He wanted to make the most 
out of his trip. He therefore planned several visits to his friends and to the people he knew on 
the way. He was taking his time to prepare for the trip and had been preparing since spring.  
 
Narrative 2: Neutral mismatching 
Cindy had just finished work and was going to her gym. She thought that going to the gym 
was individualistic and preferred volleyball. But after a knee injury, she could not play 
volleyball anymore. After changing, she entered the gym, which was empty and dark. 
“That’s strange”, she thought as she was warming up.  
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Table 3 
Mean scores (and standard deviations in brackets) of each individual differences score, after 
splitting our sample using the Ward method. In our sample, RST scores ranged from .25 to 
.94 (the total score is the product of the span and the number of correct trials), Corsi scores 
from 24 to 104 and IRI scores from 33 to 95.  
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 Figure 1. Mean differences in reading times between congruent and incongruent Emotion 
and Behavior information in Gygax et al. (2007). The slight decrease in reading time 
differences between Part I and Part II is independent of the conditions under investigation and 
reflects a certain habituation to the task by the participants. 
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Figure 2. Mean residual times in each emotion content and simulation condition, without 
considering individual differences. Negative residuals mean slower reading times (as 
predicted by each participant's regression of time by number of letters). 
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Figure 3. Mean residual times in each emotion content and simulation condition as a function 
of Corsi scores. Negative residuals mean slower reading times (as predicted by each 
participant's regression of time by number of letters). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
